Goodbye, Passwords. You Aren’t a Good Defense
Goodbye, Passwords. You Aren’t a Good Defense written by Randy Stross of the NY Times appeared today. The article starts off well and focuses entirely on the problem of passwords. I particularly like the line:
In short, we need a log-on system that relies on cryptography, not mnemonics.
Very nice. As for the rest of the article, well, everyone knows I’m a fan of Information Cards so I was glad of the mentions (especially of the Information Card Foundation). But I’m also a fan of OpenID, though not in its current form nor how it is being presented as web-scale SSO. The essence of OpenID provides a missing piece of the puzzle that Information Cards don’t. The concept is to provide the user with a web address to a set of services that work (continuously) on behalf of that user. “Pure” i-cards don’t. Pure i-card solutions (e.g. CardSpace) only work when the user is sitting in front of their machine.
Pitting one technology against another and focusing on getting rid of passwords, probably creates a more exciting story. But what we need to do is combine the best ideas from a set of complementary technologies, to create a great solution. With the right combination, you also get synergy. For example, many limitations of “pure” OpenID go away when combined with Information Card’s client architecture.
I really don’t think we’ll get Internet scale adoption with any of the “pure-play,” partial solutions, on their own. Instead, take an “extract” of OpenID, mix in a derivative of Liberty (esp. ID-WSF) services at that endpoint, top it off with i-cards, browser integration, and run it on all platforms (including mobile), and maybe we’ll have a recipe for something that works in enough real world situations to be generally useful.
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Information Cards are only secure if there are real cards in use!
Not only passwords, every security measure running only directly on a PC is vulnerable, and virtual ID-Cards (which are only data stored on your computer), are an invitation to pishers! They only have to upload this IC-Card from your Computer, and they have everything they like to have!
Why? There is a not curable flaw:
Everything running directly on a PC (specially with MS-Software) can be faked or spied on.
The only thing which helps is an external ID (Card or USB-Dongle) with embedded Microprocessor which handles all the login communication with embedded cryptography and refuses to be spied on.
I worked with the European eEurope Smart Card Initiative in 2000 and we discussed all the security problems – there is only one solution for real security: a device outside the
computer, communicating with, but not affected by the Computer and/or the Internet!
It is a myth that data on your computer are safe, even if big companies are involved and say so.
[Reply]
Comment by Dirk Bruehl — August 12, 2008 @ 3:41 pm
And how do you protect access to the URI, or the Information Card selector? Not with a password, surely..? ;^(
[Reply]
Comment by Robin Wilton — November 4, 2008 @ 7:09 am